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As I UNDERSTAND my assignment, it is to sketch a general theory to
serve as a background for the analyses of regularization of business
investment in particular industries and individual companies which
follow. My discussion has four parts:
1. Concepts
2. Significance for cycle theory




In common usage, "investment" refers to outlays one makes in order
to participate, as an owner or a creditor, in the income of other
enterprises. In this paper I use "investment" in a technical sense, to
refer to outlays made by a business firm for operating facilities ex-
pected to produce income to that enterprise.1
Business investment refers to the capital expenditures of private
business enterprises, as distinguished from those of government and
from comparable "investment" by consumers (durable goods pur-
chases).
Business investment should be defined in terms of economic be-
havior, rather than in terms of accounting convention or tax law.
The criterion is the inflexibility of the commitment involved, that is,
the rate of turnover in cash. From the standpoint of management in
planning and controlling the company's internal investments this is
the correct criterion. Capital expenditures may thus be defined as
outlays that take several years to produce an equivalent return of
cash. Their value to the company during this period is usually much
1 This distinction gets fuzzy when a firm acquires a substantial part of the
stock of another enterprise. The line can be drawn on the basis of motive, that
is, according to the degree of participation by the parent firm and of integration
of operations. More commonly the line is drawn arbitrarily at 50 per cent stock.
ownership.
37CONCEPT ANDECONOMICSIGNIFICANCE
above the amount the asset can be sold for; that is, they tie up
capital, and over long periods. They involve more uncertain fore-
casting judgment and company-wide thinking than do outlays for
short-lived assets such as inventory, or for frequently recurring
maintenance needs.
By this criterion of inflexibility of commitment, outlays for certain
intangibles, such as major research on new products and new
methods, advertising that has a cumulative effect, education of
executives, and the development of dependable distribution con-
nections, logically fall in the category of capital expenditures. They
are all outlays for facilities that tie up capital inflexibly over a long
period. But few companies treat these intangibles as part of their
capital facilities.
Even in the case of physical facilities, however, most companies
define capital expenditures, for budgeting purposes, not by the
criterion of flexibility, but by the test of "sound accounting," i.e.,
whether the company's accountants, either for stockholder reporting
or for income tax reporting, classify the outlay as capital or as
expense. The disparity between my concept and common practice
hinges largely on the relative size and the tangibility of an asset
rather than on its economic nature. The advantages of abiding by
convention and of having a monistic, all-purpose classification are,
I suppose, viewed as outweighing the greater relevance of the
broader conception (i.e., that based on flexibility of the commit-
ment) in the planning and control of capital expenditures.
The definition of investment (gross private investment) used for
national-income analysis differs from the one I have suggested, and
from that used conventionally for financial reports, and from that
used for tax reports. It is confined to tangible assets but includes
some short-lived tangibles, which are expensed. It also includes
changes in inventory, and some consumer expenditures, e.g., housing.
Thus we may distinguish four rival concepts of business invest-
ment, differently based. The bases are: flexibility of commitments;
accounting conventions of the firm in reporting its income to stock-
holders; Bureau of Internal Revenue regulations governing deter-
mination of federally taxable income; and Department of Commerce
reporting of national income.
Which of these four concepts is most appropriate for our pur-
poses? Our underlying concern in regularization of business invest-
ment is the achievement of greater stability of over-all economic
activity. Consequenfly, we are primarily interested in those busi-
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ness outlays that tend to destabilize our economy, whether they
result in tangible facilities or intangible ones. The key to instability
is managerial discretion as to the timing of the outlay. For this,
neither tangibility, tax impact, nor accounting treatment matters so
much as does the rigidity of the commitment intermsof the rate
of turnover in cash. Surprisingly enough, I like my definition best.
If what contributes to economic instabilityis the compelling
question, the concept of investment should be extended to include
consumers' expenditures for durable goods or for intangible facilities
that tie up capital over long periods. Thus besides housing, which
in national-income analysis is included in private capital formation,
it should also take in major consumer durables, and investments in
education and the like. Such consumer investments are, however,
excluded from consideration here since our concern is with capital
formation by business enterprises.
REGULAEIZATION
Regularization of business investment is a simple concept. But it has
shades of meaning which may be distinguished in two planes: pat-
tern and means. In pattern, regularization may be thought of in
three alternative ways, as: (1) merely reducing the amplitude of
swings, i.e., making capital expenditure more stable either than it
has been or than it otherwise would be; (2) making it absolutely
level cyclically (presumably with an upward trend and seasonal
fluctuations); (3) making it fluctuate contracyclically, offsetting
fluctuations in other sectors of gross national product, as a means of
achieving greater regularity of the economy as a whole. Desirable
as contracyclical or even level-trend investment may be, the prac-
tical impossibility of these two patterns will, I think, lead most of
us to use "regularization" to refer to the first pattern concept,
namely, reducing cyclical fluctuations.
As to means of attaining greater regularity, it is hard for me to
think realistically in terms of filling the valleys with investments
that would not otherwise be made at any time, or in terms of throw-
ing away the chopped-off peaks of investment. Consequently, I
think, we are concerned primarily with the rearrangement of the
time pattern of substantially the same capital outlays. Rearrange..
ment can take two forms: anticipation, the pulling-back into a de-
pression period of investments that would otherwise be made in the
next boom; and postponement, the pushing-ahead of boom-period
investment into the next depression. Both forms are signfficant.
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Significance forCycleTheory
Perhaps the most important development in economics in this
generation has been the concept of underemployment equilibrium.
Prior to 1930 most economists thought that the natural position of
the economy was one of full employment. Such periods of unem-
ployment as did exist were caused by interference in the free func-
tioning of the economic system. The assumption was that the
demand for any good was controlled by its price. No shortage of
any good could exist if the price was allowed to rise high enough
and no surpius could exist if the price was allowed to fall far
enough. Consequently unemployment was caused by artificially high
wages; a drop in wages would cause employers to use more labor.
Production created its own demand. If the recipient of income did
not spend it on consumption, he would, with the insignificant excep-
tion of hoarders, invest it (either directly or by making his savings
available to others who would invest it). Thus the amount of
economic activity which produced the income would take place
again and production would perpetuate itself. However, this view
neglected the possibility that the desire to save might be greater
than the desire to invest. Consumers might increase their rate of
saving. With consumption decreasing, there would not be enough
sound new investment to put the increased savings to work. Un-
wanted inventories of consumer goods would cause manufacturers
to curtail production and reduce employment. Since demand for
labor depends on demand for goods, employment would continue
to decline until income was reduced to such a level that net savings
were equal to intended investment.
The same sort of thing would happen if the first impulse came
from a drop in the desire to invest. Decreased employment in in-
vestment goods industries would result, and would lead to decreased
consumption and decreased employment in consumer goods indus-
tries. Employment would decrease until saving out of the new lower
incomes came down to the level of intended investment; that is, until
all goods being produced were either being sold or voluntarily put
into stock.
Excessive desire to save would not force down interest rates and
thus encourage investment enough to take up the slack, as had been
thought earlier. Liquidity preference theory viewed interest, not as
the reward for saving (postponing consumption), but rather as the
reward for giving up liquidity. Recognition of the speculative
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motive for holding cash led to a realization that the rate of interest
is only a minor influence on saving and on most investment decisions.
Modern economic theory has stressed the basic importance of
consumption demand in influencing investment decisions. Several
economists, notably Samuelson, Harrod, and Hicks, have incor-
porated J. M. Clark's acceleration principle into the Keynesian sys-
tem and have produced models which fluctuate in the manner of
business cycles. The most recent and highly developed of these is
expounded in J. R. Hicks' A Contribution to the Theory of the Trade
Cycle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950).
Hicks splits investment into two parts: autonomous and induced,
where induced investment is the direct result of an increase in
economic activity and autonomous investment is all other invest-
ment. Starting from an underemployment equilibrium, a spurt in
autonomous investment will cause an increase in consumption, in
accordance with the Kahn multiplier. This greater activity will
induce investment, which will cause increased consumption, which
will induce more investment, etc. Thus economic activity will con-
tinue upward until one of the following developments takes place:
the amount of investment induced by further increases in economic
activity tends to diminish relatively, so that the upward impulse dies
out; a monetary stringency occurs and prevents new investment
which would otherwise be made; or the economy reaches the
temporary ceiling of its ability to produce and thus stops expanding,
except through natural increase in working force or productivity.
Once the rate of increase decreases, the bloom is off the boom, since
induced investment depends on the acceleration of economic activ-
ity. When the rate of acceleration decreases, induced investment
decreases, causing a further decrease in the acceleration, etc., until
induced plus autonomous investment are not large enough to sup-
port the high level of income. Hitting the ceiling ends acceleration,
or at least reduces it materially, and this will cause a downturn.
During the recession, negative induced investment exists in the
form of failure to replace machinery at a rate equal to depreciation.
The downswing may be ended, according to Hicks, by a weaken-
ing of the accelerator on negative induced investment, or by a spurt
in autonomous investment, but in any case it can go no further than
the floor under economic activity which is partly established by
autonomous investment. Once the downward momentum is stopped,
an upturn will ensue.
Whether or not they accept a theory of the type of Hicks', it is
41CONCEPT AND ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE
probable that most economists now think that the motivating force
in economic fluctuations is investment. Consumption and saving
have been viewed as relatively stable functions of income, while
investment may fluctuate wildly.
It should be recognized, however, that since consumption is a
much greater quantity than investment, small percentage changes
in consumption are as important as relatively large percentage
changes in investment. The consumption function (or schedule of
the propensity to consume) has shown considerable instability over
the past fifteen years. These gyrations may be mainly traced to the
imposition of wartime control and the releasing of pent-up demand
after full civilian production was resumed. Consumer durables—that
is, consumption items with investment characteristics—played a
dominant role in these wartime shifts in propensity to spend. Again,
an increase in the propensity to spend money on consumer durables
played a large part in the post-Korean boom. But this, also, was an
abnormal situation, induced by the fear of wartime shortages and
the expectation of a wartime boom. This kind of military disturbance
of the stability of the consumption function makes one wonder how
"abnormal" it will be in the future we face. Economists have not
paid enough attention to shifts in the consumption function.
It is still apparent, however, that business investment plays an
important role in economic fluctuations. It is undeniable that invest-
ment is highly unstable and highly destabilizing. To Keynesians, it
is investment that determines the level of income. If investment
remains at a iow level for a long period, underemployment equilib-
rium results. If investment fluctuates, a cycle results.
Investment is also a causal factor in economic fluctuations to most
of the modern non-Keynesians. The business cycle isgenerally
viewed as a cumulation of a number of forces acting largely upon
the motive to invest. During the upswing, forces build up which will
eventually call a halt to the increasing tempo of investment and
bring on the downturn. During depression, forces build up which
will cause an upturn in investment and thus initiate the upswing.
There is much agreement among economists on the vital causal
role of fluctuations in business investment in business cycles. What
can be done to stabilize investment?
The Theory of Capital Budgeting
Business investment has been viewed, in the preceding section, as
a broad aggregate in the context of general economic analysis. The
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behavior of this investment aggregate depends primarily on the
capital expenditure decisions of individual firms.
The mechanics of the Keynesian system require a little modifica-
tion and expansion if they are to fit into a scheme of planning that
could be used by a large American firm in planning and rationing
its capital expenditures.
Our principal hope of finding out what can be done to regularize
business investment lies in understanding better the managerial
problems of planning and controlling capital expenditures. Itis
becoming conventional to label this area of decisions "capital budg-
eting." The term "budget" does not connote that the investments of
the firm can or should be predetermined for any time period. In-
stead it refers to the process of projecting investments and selecting
the most desirable ones.
FOUR QUESTIONS
To get a clearer view of the essentials of the process, we shall out-
line an analytical framework that will systematize management's
approach tothis problem. Capital budgeting precipitates four
questions:
How much money can be profitably invested in the company?
How much capital will be available?
How should this capital be rationed among rival investments?
How should its investment be timed cyclically?
The problem of cyclical timing of a firm's capital expenditures
cannot be divorced from other phases of the decision-making process
in capital formatioD. If the company's capital demand and supply
could be forecast and planned for a cycle ahead, a clean separation
of timing strategy would be conceivable. But this kind of long-range
investment planning requires unattainable foresight.
Ideally, capital expenditures should be planned for several years
ahead as an integrated part of the company's long-term program.
But projections become increasingly indefinite as they stretch into
the future, and as a practical matter it is usually necessary to budget
capital expenditures over a one-year, or at most a two-year planning
period. Cyclical considerations are an intimate part of each yearly
survey of a firm's investment opportunities and supply of funds.
DEMAND FOR CAPITAL
The underlying requisite for effective capital expenditure planning
is the opportunity to invest money internally at high rates of return.
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Such opportunities are, in a sense, a by-product of efficient manage-
ment, but also need to be sought out systematically. Consequently,
a survey of the company's capital requirements built up from the
roots of the smallest operating unit is usually the first step in capital
budgeting.
The demand for funds for investment within a company can be
viewed as a schedule of relationship between the amount to be in-
vested and the prospective rate of return. In the development of
such a schedule, individual investment proposals showing estimated
yield should be arrayed in a ladder of capital productivity, sum-
marized on a company-wide basis for a specified planning period.
Table 1 illustrates the firm's demand schedule for capital, and chart
1 diagrams this demand schedule.
TABLE 1








Over 100 2 2
50-100 38 40
25- 50 200 240
15- 25 1,200 1,440
5- 15 3,400 4,840
From Joel Dean, Capital Budgeting, Columbia University Press, 1951.
Profitability of investment may be measured in several ways: as
payback, average level net return on investment, or discounted
return on investment. The economically correct measure of profit-
ability is the discounted rate of return, which takes into account
the time schedule of outlays and receipts over the economic life
of the project. It is frequently feasible to develop approximations
to this ideal measure that are good enough to produce better
estimates of the economic productivity of the project than payback
or level return estimates. Table 2 illustrates the method and com-
pares its results for two machines, both priced at $2,000 and both
with a four-year payout.
The vital practical problem in capital budgeting is to obtain
reasonably accurate and comparable estimates of return on invest-
ment, with adequate allowances for risk and strategy. The demand
schedule derived therefrom shifts with changes in general business
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Chart1
Demand Schedule for Capital
RATE OF RETURN ONINVESTMENT
Machine A MachineB
AnnualDiscountPresent value AnnualDiscountPresent value
Yearincomefactora of income incomefactora of income
y I d Ixd I d Ixd
1 500 0.9309 465 500 0.8976 488
2 500 0.8052 403 500 0.7204 358
3 500 0.6900 348 500 0.5781 287
4 500 0.6024 301 500 0.4639 230
5 500 0.5211 260 500 0.3728 183
6 500 0.4508 225 500 0.2988 149
7 500 0.2398 118
8 500 0.1924 94
9 500 0.1544 75
10 500 0.1289 60
Total present value $2,002 $2,000
Rate of return 14.5% 22.3%















FromJoel Dean, Capital Budgeting, Columbia University Press, 1951.
TABLE 2
1000 2000 3000 4000
Voiumeof (nvestment
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in the firm's demand for capital that are the major cause of fluctua-
tions in private capital formation.
For simplicity, the firm's demand schedule has been conceived
here as including only capital projects to be initiated during the
coming year. This means that it should include only those invest-
ments whose productivity will never be higher than in this year.
Those that will improve if postponed should go into future budgets.
Those that will deteriorate if postponed should be put in this year's
demand curve. This simple conception concentrates on a project's
rivalry with alternative investments to be made in a given year. It
ignores another dimension of rivalry—namely, that with alternative
investments likely to be more profitable if made in subsequent years.
If future investments are to be included in this year's demand
curve, it becomes necessary to conceive of patterns for storing funds
for later use. This storage can be in cash equivalents, or in invest-
ments that have high cash-to-cash turnover even though compara-
tively low prospective rate of return. The cost of maintaining liquidity
for future use is an offset to the improvement in profitability of a
later-year investment over a present-year investment. Rejecting a
20 per cent return today in order to save money for a 40 per cent
return two years hence involves carrying costs. Conceiving of
demand for funds in the time dimension, therefore, requires an
exploration of the alternative time patterns of investment in terms
of requisite liquidity. It ties capital budgeting intimately into the
long-term cash budget by imposing dual standards: productivity and
cash payout.
Tax expectations also have a bearing on the timing of investments
in projects where substantial parts of outlays are, for tax purposes,
expenses. If the marginal tax rate is 82 per cent this year, and
expected to be 60 per cent next year, an asset that can be written
off slowly by depreciation charges is more expensive than one that
can be totally written off against this year's income.
SUPPLY OF CAPITAL
A company, in addition to exploring and measuring its demand for
capital funds, must face the problems of determining where the
money will come from. Two sources, internal and external, may be
distinguished. A company's chief internal sources of supply of funds
for capital expenditures are depreciation and retained net profits.
To distinguish between these two in the apportionment of internal.
investment is illusory. The chief managerial problems in respect to
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internal sources are forecasting the amount of cash that will be
generated, and deciding how much of earnings to pay out in divi-
dends and how much to plow back in capital expenditures.
Dramatic increases in price level throw doubt on the replacement
adequacy of depreciation allowances based on historical cost and
make extracurricular allowances and outright increases in amount
plowed back necessary to assure replacement.
Inflation can cause conventional accounts to seriously overstate
real economic earnings. Thus, not only is the depreciation held out
inadequate for replacement, but the earnings plowed back look
bigger than they are. Many large companies have, in the inflation
after World War II, paid out dividends in excess of real earnings,
quite legally and quite unknowingly. The result is that capital
expenditures which appear to have come out of retained earnings
have actually come out of real working capital. This illusion of
accountancy may have caused business investment to be somewhat
higher in the postwar inflationary boom than it would have been if
the low level of real earnings had been generally recognized.
Retained earnings are a major source of capital funds. Plow-back
policy is affected by many considerations, such as opportunities for
investment inside the company as opposed to opportunities outside,
regularity of stockholders' income, reserves for contingencies and
growth, and the effect of plowing back on cost of capital from
outside.
The pivotal consideration in external supply of funds is the cost of
capital. In theory it should signal the appropriate amount and timing
of dividend payouts that restrict internal supply and also indicate
when and how much recourse should be had to external supply.
Hence cost of capital has an important role in fluctuation in business
investment.
To estimate a firm's cost of capital involves determination of
market values of securities, costs of flotation, and capital structure.
Cost of capital is affected by many factors over which management
has some control—company policy on plowing back, capital struc-
ture, level of market at time of issue, size of issue, amount raised,
and market fame of company. Projections of future costs of capital,
therefore, have a wide band of control, its width depending partly
on the stabilization of these variables by company policy.
Aversion to permanent external financing is quite common. Appar-
ently it stems from fear of personal-income-tax leakages, notions
that autonomous financing is more respectable, and distaste for pos-
47CONCEPT AND ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE
sible restrictions. The aversion can cut off a large reservoir of funds
for exploiting opportunities.
Autonomous capital formation raises questions of broad economic
policy which have an important practical bearing upon the cyclical
pattern of business investment. The undoubted efficiency with which
some big companies apportion funds within the fold may more than
compensate for the fact that individual operating units do not have
to meet the market test for funds. But this efficiency cannot be
relied upon to overcome the injury to our resource allocation system
when the corporation as a whole invests money internally at pro-
spective rates of return that depart significantly from its external
long-run cost of capital.
CAPITAL BATIONING
A company's demand for investment funds typically exceeds its
supply. Hence it is necessary to ration capital, screening individual
proposals, ideally on the basis of prospective rate of return (after
allowance for risks).
The essence of capital rationing is to rank investment proposals in
a ladder of profitability and find a rejection criterion by which to
cut off the projects that would not be sufficiently profitable. The-
oretically, this cutoff rate of capital productivity could be auto-
matically determined by the intersection of the firm's demand and
supply schedules for capital. However, for administrative reasons,
rejection rates must be set by management, by rough forecasts of
the intersection rate. Crude as they are, these forecasts when related
to the firm's cost of capital can provide some basis for decisions on
dividend 'policy and on recourse to outside financing. Another role
of the cutoff rate is to weed out projects that have too low a profit-
ability to justify further consideration.
A third use is to implement a long-run capital budgeting plan
designed to avoid marginal investments of low productivity in times
of slack investment demand. Funds thus conserved can be invested
for higher returns when demand turns up again.
For example, the cutoff rate for expenditures in all phases of the
business cycle might be stabilized regardless of short-run shifts in
demand and supply. In this form, the rejection rate is a rough sub-
stitute for the kind of budgeting that would include rivalry of
projects to be undertaken at different dates. It requires, however, a
projection for an integral business cycle of both the total demand
schedule and the total internal supply schedule. Making this projec-
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tion is worth while oniy when the firm's capital sources for the cycle
as a whole are so inadequate, when compared with demand, that
the long-run cutoff point is far above the cost of capital.
FLUCTUATING EFFECTIVE CUTOFF BATE
The rate of return which will equilibrate a company's demand for
funds with its supply will fluctuate with shifts in its capital demand
and supply schedules. The equilibrium rate cannot be determined
with precision, since this requires forecasts of shifting demand and
supply functions.
A fluctuating effective rate can pinch-hit for it. This administered
rate is more than merely a guess at the rate that would clear the
firm's capital market. It embodies other considerations. The under-
lying reasons for moving the effective rate up and down include
variations in the supply of funds available to the company for
capital expenditures; speculations on price changes for capital
equipment; fear of general declines in business, which produces a
high liquidity preference; and informal deflation of earnings rate
estimates.2
In formulating a theory of the effective cutoff rate, two situations
need to be distinguished: that of an autonomous firm, determined to
limit itself to internally generated funds for permanent financing of
capital expenditures; and that of a firm willing to go outside for
additional funds, either occasionally or regularly. The distinctive
nature of the budgeting problem stems from the distinctive behavior
of the supply curves in these two cases.
In autonomous financing, the company supply curve is a shifting
vertical line (see chart 2). Cyclical shifts in a company's demand
curve are likely to be accompanied by parallel shifts in its supply
curve, since the volume of investment prospects is related to current
income. This parallelism tends to reduce the amplitude of cyclical
fluctuations in the cutoff rate, insofar as it is determined by inter-
section. It is not possible to generalize about the relative level of
the cutoff rate in boom and prosperity, since this depends on the
2Duringboom periods, anticipations concerning future earnings tend to
become inflated, despite herculean efforts topside to keep middle management's
feet on the ground. Some companies have informally deflated these oversanguine
boonitime earnings prospects by raising the effective rate. Thus, one oil com-
pany has taken the position that declines in the price level of petroleum products
will convert an apparent one-year payout proposal into a two-year payout
























Fluctuating Effective Cut— Off Rate
A.Autonomous Financing
B.External Financing
From Joel Dean, Capital Budgeting, Columbia University Press, 1951.
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swing of supply and demand curves relative to each other. When
supply fluctuates more than demand, the intersection cutoff rate will
be higher in depression than in prosperity.
A good case can be made for high cutoffs in depression, since
management's interest points toward stabilizing dividends, which
increases the volatility of the supply curve. The nature of a particu-
lar boom also affects cyclical disparity in the cutoff rate. In the boom
after World War II, pent-up demand for capital goods made the
demand curve for many firms exceptionally high, and tended to
boost the cutoff rate. At the same time, real earnings were exag-
gerated by reported earnings, because of inflation. Companies that
were aware of this viewed their supply curves in a way that further
lifted their cutoff rates.
A company that is willing to get outside capital has a flat supply
curve that probably turns up sharply at some point. This cost-of-
capital curve moves up and down cyclically, probably in the oppo-
site direction from shifts in the company's demand for funds. In
depressions, cost of capital is high, and demand low. In prosperity,
cost is low, whereas demand has shifted to the right. Cost of capital,
used in conjunction with the demand schedule, should signal when
dividends can be allowed to restrict internal supply, and when and
how much recourse should be had to external supply.
BASIC MINIMUM BATE
An adjunct to the fluctuating effective rate is a basic minimum rate
of return, the purpose of which is to keep the company from making
investments that cannot earn enough to pay their cost of capital. The
minimum rate should be set by anticipating future cost of capital.
If the company can bridge a gap with short-term borrowing, so as
to raise permanent capital at a low-cost time later, this floor rate
will be lower than the current or the long-period average cost of
capital.
STABLE LONG-RUN CUTOFF RATE
An alternative to this team of fluctuating effective rate and minimum
rate is a cyclical policy founded on a stable long-run cutoff rate that
is the same for all phases of the business cycle. The purpose is to
avoid having to pass up high profit prospects in times of high
demand because funds were squandered on low-return investments
in periods of low demand. In effect, this system tries to put the next
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ten years' investment opportunities on a single demand curve, to
compete for the ten-year supply of funds.3
The long-run cutoff rate is not a logically complete approach to
cyclical capital budgeting. Investments this year do not necessarily
compete with investments to be made four years hence, particularly
if they have high cash payout rates. Moreover, this simple solution
cannot include the time dimension of competition for capital, i.e.,
the same project at alternative dates. Nevertheless, there is much
administrative value in the long-run rate. Long-run planning in
terms of alternative investment schedules must usually be limited
to budgeting for the few grand schemes that dominate company
ambitions. Planning for smaller projects becomes lost in uncertainty
as the planning period is extended. The alternatives are too numer-
ous and interrelated to be plotted out in detail. It is here that the
cutoff rate can be brought into use, in the routine budget-
ing of these lesser proposals. If management has established a broad
view of the company's future, the long-run rate can be made a time-
saving device for tying the minor parts into an integrated scheme.
The theory of capital expenditure control just outlined is ideal-
Yet it can be approximated in practice, and probably is. At
least, this kind of thinking is found in some large corporations.
Capital expenditures are cut back when depression is here, or is
expected soon, by pulling the purse strings through various devices
instead of (or in addition to) raising the effective cutoff rate of
return. But the results, for cyclical fluctuations, are the same. The
costs and risks of stabilized capital expenditure are recognized, even
though they may not be set forth so elegantly as in a scheme of
time rivalry built into demand and supply functions that are based
on rate of return.
Cyclical Policies
The desirability, from the standpoint of maintaining high and stable
employment and national income, of reducing the amplitude of the
The empirical foundation for this kind of theoretical solution is frail. In
a dynamic technology it is hard to foresee even the investment opportunities,
to say nothing of their return. Forecasts of cash-generating ability depend
for accuracy on projecions of national economic activity over heroic distances
into the future. Moreover, the long-term future cost of capital from outside can
only be guessed from the past by assuming that the capricious stock market will
follow historical patterns in the future.
4The analysis is worked out more fully in my book Capital Budgeting,
Columbia University Press, 1951.
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swings in capital expenditures by private firms is clear; but only by
a conscious revision of capital expenditure policies can regulariza-
tion of a firm's investment be brought about. The practical issue
management faces is how far the firm can go in regularization
without incurring more cost and risk than its obligation to stock-
holders warrants.
The major issue before this conference is whether stabilization of
business investment is primarily the job of private management or
primarily the job of government. Can the executives of a company,
while discharging their profit-making obligations to stockholders
really do much in the way of reducing fluctuations in the firm's
capital expenditures? This is the first question, since we want govern-
ment's role to be confined to activities that cannot be effectively
performed by the private sector of the economy.
(n answering this question we must assume that substantial fluc-
tuations in economic activity will occur in the future. Otherwise,
there is no point to this conference. This does not necessarily mean
that we expect future cyclical fluctuations to be exactly like past
ones. Basic changes in our institutions, notably the evolution of big
government and the division into two bellicose worlds, will make
future fluctuations different and possibly less pronounced. But it is
not proper at this point in the analysis to assume that government
will have to take over the job of investment stabilization, or that it
will develop effective policies which will do away with cyclical fluc-
tuations. This possibility of default should be ruled out of order at
this point, since how much of the job of stabilization of capital forma-
tion will have to be taken over by government is what we seek to
find out in this analysis. And how government might do this job is
an entirely different issue. The question then is: To what extent can
these future fluctuations in business activity and in private capital
formation be reduced by the action of private management in
regularizing the individual firm's capital expenditures?
Decisions on capital expenditures get closer scrutiny by the board
of directors (who usually represent owners) than any other kind
of top management decisions. Conseqently itis proper first to
examine the desirability of an investment regularization policy using
the traditional criterion of profit maximization. There are some
possibilities of investment stabilization in the area of profit neutrality
where indeterminacy and ignorance give management some timing
latitude within its profit-making obligations. There are also some
possibilities in the realm of managerial philanthropy, i.e., in aiming
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at less than maximum profits so as to make a contribution to the
social good. But these are, in my experience, an unimportant source
of stability. Consequently, this paper is primarily concerned with
how far management can go in stabilizing capital expenditures with-
out breaching its stockholder obligation to make the most money it
can within the rules of the game.
In the foregoing discussion of capital rationing, two alternative
cyclical policies for capital expenditure budgeting were noted. The
first used a fluctuating standard of minimum acceptable profitability
which for the autonomous firm not only would rise and fall with
variations in its cost of capital, but also would, at cyclical crests, rise
significantly above its cost of capital because of the inadequacy of
self-generated funds to meet boom capital demand. Thus wide
swings in the standard of marginal productivity would be contem-
plated. For a firm willing to supplement internal funds from outside,
the swings in the cutoff rate over the cycle would be determined by
fluctuations in its cost of capital, which would pulsate with condi-
tions of the security The alternative policy is a constant
rejection rate which does not fluctuate cyclically, being formulated
to clear the firm's internal capital market for the cycle as a whole by
balancing capital demand with self-generated supply. For a firm that
raises capital funds outside, the cyclically stable rejection rate would
be determined by its projection of future long-run cost of capital.6
Either of these policies will result in wide fluctuations in the level
of investment activity, since it is visible demand, which is highly
volatile, rather than a vague guess about long-run demand, that
determines this year's outlay. When these fluctuations are added up
for all industry, they are clearly a powerful destabilizing influence
on the level of economic activity.
Our problem is to find out how far the management of an indi-
vidual firm can go in damping the fluctuations in cap.ital expendi-
tures that result from cyclical shifts in the firm's capital demand and
supply schedules.
In making this decision, management must be governed primarily
by the effects of investment stabilization on profits. Hence it must
Over a period similar to the last twenty-five years, for example, the com-
bined cost of capital (equity and debt) that an established, large manufacturer
might have to pay might be expected to fluctuate between 6 per cent and 30 per
cent. The range would differ considerably among companies.
6 For example, 15 per cent might be a forecast for a manufacturing firm
based on a study of that company's investment market experience of the last
quarter century.
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try to estimate the prospective gains and the prospective costs of
undertaking more capital expenditures in depression and less in
prosperity.
INDIBECT GAINS
Thegains possible for the firm from stabilizing capital expenditures
are both indirect and direct. Indirect gains arise to the degree that
stabilization of the individual company's investment brings about
more stability of the economy as a whole. Such stabilization reduces
fluctuations in demand for the firm's products and permits more
predictable and stable operations. If all firms were able and willing
to make their capital expenditures stable, there is no doubt that a
substantial reduction of general economic fluctuations would result.
This would bring a legion of benefits, including greater stability
and predictability of demand, production, and employment; more
orderly capital markets; and more foreseeable cost of capital. But
such resultants would be predicated on widespread acceptance and
conformity, which, without compulsive incentives, are highly fin-
probable.
It seems to me, therefore, that indirect benefits stemming from
the atomistic contribution to stabilization that is made by a single
firm's regularization of its investment will be negligible. Benefits
that are produced by an "imitation effect" on the regularization of
other firms' investment are so unlikely or at least so highly conjec-
tural that they cannot be taken seriously in a company's economic
calculations.
DIRECT CAlMS
A variety of direct gains, which are, not dependent on greater
stability of the whole economy, are possible. Regularization of the
firm's capital expenditures can, as noted earlier, be achieved either
by pulling back into depression the investments that would be made
in a later boom, or by postponing boom-period investments until the
next depression. The direction of regularization does not matter as
much for appraisal of gains as for appraisal of losses. But direct
gains are usually visualized in terms of pulling capital outlays back.
Increasing the proportion of investments made at cyclically low
price levels can lead to savings in acquisition and construction costs.
Some indication of savings from cyclical price cuts can be found in
the Engineering News Record index of construction costs and the
Marshall-Stevens index of equipment costs. The Engineering News
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Record index, for example, fell by 30 per cent from 1920 to 1922 and
by 24 per cent from 1929 to 1982. However, in mild depressions such
as those of 1923-1924, 1926-1927, and 1937-1938, construction costs
fell very little (less than 2 per cent). In the Marshall-Stevens index,
equipment costs showed, smaller declines than construction costs
in general; but such an index, not taking account of informal con-
cessiOns below quoted prices, usually understates the amplitude of
fluctuations.
Moreover, there are potential cost savings in the unhurried plan-
ning, purchase, and development of new facilities. During the down-
ward swing of the cycle, business is slack and the rate of activity is
low. In such times, suppliers give a maximum of free service extras,
construction forces tend to have higher productivity, the engineering
staff can devote ample time to long-run plans, and executives can
survey the project more closely. The result is higher quality, better
scheduling, and closer integration of the new investment into the
existing organization.
A further incentive to a smoother pattern of investment is the
availability of capacity in the early stages of recovery. Advantages
of starting expansion programs in advance of a period of prosperity
derive from the long gestation periods typical of big construction
jobs. To realize these advantages fully, it is necessary to forecast
the rate of recovery from the depression. Moreover, they are often
whittled down when the bottleneck factor is not plant capacity but
some other input factor, such as steel or skilled labor. Rather than
gain being due solely to greater capacity, a part comes from having
a more modern, lower-cost plant when demand resurges.
Another possible gain from stabilizing capital expenditures, per-
haps not inconsiderable, is that smaller errors of optimism might be
made in appraising capital productivity than frequently characterize
boomtime estimates of rate of return.
COSTS OF BECULARIZATION
Offsetting these gains from stabilization is a fonnidable list of extra
costs in a stabilized investment program. In assessing such costs,
management needs to distinguish two aspects of this stabilization
problem: the decision whether in boom periods to postpone outlays
until the following recession, and the slump-period decision whether
to invest now rather than in the upswing.
During peak activity, many expenditures cannot be postponed
without dire strategic consequences. In this category are defensive
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investments to fend off competitors who are invading markets with
new products. Product obsolescence is a particularly important
deterrent to cyclical stability where style changes are frequent and
involve heavy outlays.
An automobile manufacturer, for example, cannot in prosperity
postpone the retooling needed to keep his cars competitive in style
and performance. This competitive compulsion in investment timing
usually applies to innovations. Few modern producers have a suffi-
ciently long and certain research lead over potential competitors to
gamble by delaying commercialization of a new product for the
sake of speculative gain on facilities or for philanthropy. Whether
most innovations hit the market in prosperous times or depressions
is not at issue. The question is whether management has much lati-
tucle in altering the timing of the investment they cause.
If, in prosperity, the current volume of orders exceeds capacity,
the likelihood that long delivery delays will shift customers to
competitors who may be able to hold them far into a recession is a
compelling strategic reason for capital expenditures. In the postwar
boom, when shares of the market were virtually determined by
productive capacity, and when companies had a good chance of
retaining a captured share, many of them constructed additional
plant capacity at penalty prices in order to expand or to hold a share
of the market they had won.7 In these instances, plant additions
were an economical way to buy a share, as opposed to the slow,
grueling method of battling for it in a buyer's market. Only if the
heavy costs of winning that market position in the normal competi-
tive tussle were overshadowed by lower acquisition costs in depres-
sion and the prospect of technological advances in the interim would
postponement be economically desirable.
There are, beside the strategic risks of boom-period expenditure
postponements, costs and risks inherent in spending at the trough of
the cycle. These can be roughly grouped as follows: a reduction in
the present worth of a fluctuating stream of earnings; the increased
risks of obsolescence of products and processes; the higher cost of
funds; the increased risks of insufficient liquidity; and the hazards
of imperfect foresight.
7 For example, there was a stage when capacity to produce governed shares
in the automobile market, and the proved propensity of motorists to trade in on
the same brand assured retention of a share if future models could be kept
competitive.
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DISPARITY IN PRESENT WORTH
The gross profits from an investment will usually be higher in pros-
perity years than in depression. Since the value of an income dollar
at a distant date is less than at a near date, the value of an invest-
ment is less when its near years are lean than when they are fat.
Consequently, if the acquisition costs of an investment are the same
in prosperity as in depression, the present value of its stream of
earnings will be higher if it is acquired in prosperity than in de-
pression.
The amount of this disparity in present value depends on the
amplitude of the fluctuations in profits, the rate at which future
earnings are discounted to present value, and the length of the
projected economic life of the asset. The sensitivity of the value of
an investment to its cyclical timing increases with volatility of
earnings. Sensitivity also rises sharply with the rate of discount.8
The effect of the economic life of the assets on the disparity in
present value is a complicated relation between the life of the
investment and the length of the cycle. A description of this relation
is beyond the scope of our discussion, but it is clear that a shorter
life span involves greater risks in cyclical timing, because small
deviations from the optimum date of purchase take more value from
an investment that will last through two cycles than from one that
will last through five cycles.
Table S illustrates the impact of two of the three factors men-
tioned—cyclical amplitude and rate of discount—on cyclical shifts in
the present value of an investment. It shows the difference between
the present value of the prospective earnings stream of an invest-
ment made at the peak of prosperity, and the present value of an
identical stream for the same investment made in the trough of
depression (assuming prices, technology, cost of capital, etc. con-
stant). The calculation is for an investment of a twenty-year life,
when earning cycles last four years. The difference is expressed as
a per cent of present value of the investment when made at peak
prosperity. The true disparity in values is understated, because the
cost of capital is assumed to be the same in prosperity and
8Acriterion of quick payback (e.g., return of investment in two years)
is a crude expression of a high time-discount rate, which accentuates disparity
in present In effect, it usually considers only the current phase of the
cycle, discounting distant revenues down to zero.
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TABLE 3
CYCLICAL SENSITIVITY IN VALUE
OF A Nzw INVESTMENT
PER CENT CHANGE IN PRESENT VALUE OF
Rate of INVESTMENT FROM PROSPERITY TO DEpRESSIONa
di3countb WHEN THE AMPLITUDE OF THE CYCLEC Is:
(in per cent) 0.5 5.0 10.0
4 0.065 0.650 1.290
10 0.400 3.960 7.760
20 14.770 88.730 122.930
a Present value of investment made in prosperity minus present value of
investment made in depression as per cent of prosperity investment value.
b Rate at which future earnings are discounted to present value.




sion,though it is likely in fact to be lower for investment in pros-
perity.9
RISKS OF OBSOLESCENCE
If technologyisadvancing rapidly, equipment acquired years
ahead in anticipation of a boom may become obsolete before it does
the expected work.b0 (Equipment brought into production shortly
before a boom collapses may meet the same fate.) Thus to pull
investments forward into the lean years not only gives them a lower
value but may also significantly increase the ever-present risk of
This analysis of disparity in present worth necessarily oversimplifies, since
cyclical policy on capital expenditures is hounded by various kinds of uncer-
tainty: (1) Unknown future cyclical fluctuations: Forecasting future pulsations
of the earnings of a proposed investment is necessarily rough and inaccurate as
to timing and amplitude of fluctuations. But precise foresight is not required.
When discount rates are high, all that is required is recognition of a boom and
belief in depression. (2) Unknown longevity:All facilities have uncertain
economic lives and some live long. Longevity merely reduces the importance
of this present-worth deterrent to stabilization. It doesn't obviate or reverse it.
And uncertainty about length of life has no systematic effect on its importance.
At high discount rates, which are common, distant earnings have little present
worth anyhow. (3) Longevity gestation period: When facilities require many
months to get into operation there is danger that projects planned in prosperity
may not come into production until depression. This may cause some inadvertent
valley-filling, but is not a systematic influence toward stabilization.
10 The costs involved are not less real when hidden by hand-me-down idle-
ness. Newest equipment goes into highest-grade service and hence may get used
even in slack times; existing equipment sometimes gets demoted down succes-
sive ranks of stand-by status (particularly in public utilities). Premature retire-
ments to stand-by and excessive reserve capacity are costly, too.
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unforeseen obsolescence. A further cost of such contracyclically
planned investment may also be the physical deterioration of unused
capacity with the passage of time; but since most modern equip-
ment gets outmoded before it is worn out, this would rarely be a net
addition to obsolescence.
COST OF CAPITAL
Another limitation on stabilizing investment expenditures takes the
form of a higher supply cost of funds. Since internal funds depend on
retained earnings and dividend policy, and external funds are subject
to the changes in the amount and cost of the capital that is offered
by the market, there are pronounced cyclical swings in both internal
and external availability of capital. Companies that refuse to go to
the money market for funds are subject to cyclical fluctuations in
internal sources. Firms without aversion to external sources of funds
also experience shifts in their supply schedule, coming additionally
from fluctuations in the current cost of capital. Particularly violent
are the changes in earnings-price ratios and dividend-price yields
of common stocks.
Thus nearly all companies must expect pronounced cyclical shifts
in supply of funds for capital formation.h1 To stabilize investments,
a firm must raise or save funds in booms that it can carry over to
depressions, or else must borrow on short term in depressions in
anticipation of raising funds in booms. If prosperity earnings are
saved for depression spending, there is a cost of carrying funds,
which must be levied on interim projects or on the depression invest-
ment itself, or on both. The other solution, borrowing for contra-
cyclically timed investments, would be for most firms impossible or
extremely expensive, since it would run completely counter to the
philosophy of commercial banking.
LIQUIDITY PREFERENCES
A still further limitation, not easily separated from some of the
preceding, arises from the cyclical changes in liquidity preferences
that stem partly from general uncertainty in periods of depression.
Going against the cycle requires intelligence, courage, and con-
11Thesefluctuations can be reduced and the average cost of capital lowered
by varying the proportion of debt to equity opportunistically to fit security-
market fashions in favored types of security. When prices of common stocks are
low, bonds are a more appealing type of financing; but this kind of arbitrage
is an important possibility for only a few industries.
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fidence. When the general situation looks bad, prospective earnings.
on capital expenditures lose their luster and in the general gloom
are heavily discounted. The fear that cash will be needed for opera-
tions if the depression becomes worse breeds timidity and compels
hoarding. Cyclical changes in uncertainties and in management's
appraisal and treatment of them are to a degree an autonomous
cause of cyclical fluctuations, but it is impossible to separate real
uncertainties from illusions born of the disasters of the Great
Depression.
POOR FORECASTING
A final compelling deterrent to stabilization is the risk from im-
perfect foresight as to future demand. Few boards of directors
would, or probably should, have the audacity to authorize large
capital expenditures in the depths of a depression on the expectation
that expanded capacity would be needed in a later upturn. Serious
errors could be made with respect to the level and geographical
pattern of sales, the character of the product, and the nature of the
technology.'2 The savings that could have been made from depressed
prices and construction costs can be insignificant as compared with
the hazards arising from inadequate forecasts of demand and tech-
nology. The earnings on distant revenues must compete at their
discounted present value with alternative opportunities. But more
important are the risks that long-range sales forecasts will prove too
bold and that changes in products and technology will make the
new plant obsolete before it is really put to work.
Uncertainty plays a large role in the cyclical fluctuation of internal
investment opportunities. The notion that opportunities are much
richer in prosperity is widespread and understandable. The amount
of added capacity needed for a current boom can be foreseen with
much greater clarity and certainty than the amount needed for a
vaguely distant boom. Forecasts about the latter may be discounted
down to nothing.
It is conceivable that when business is booming, when investment
funds are plentiful, and when labor rates are rising, the search for
investment opportunities is more intense. As a result, more oppor-
tunities are found—but not because more are there. Cyclical changes
in the optimism with which prospective profitability is viewed are
12 For example, who could have foreseen in 1938 the importance of the auto-
matic transmission in automobiles today? Who can now foresee how fast tele-
vision will displace radio and motion pictures?
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probably quite pronounced and may account for much of the shift in
demand schedules. This is particularly true when conjectures about
the future are inadvertently or explicitly based on an assumption
that present conditions will continue indefinitely. Unless great care
is taken to purge estimates of this propensity, profitability will look
much better in prosperity than in depression.'3
Conclusions
The desirability of a policy of stabilizing capital expenditures
cyclically depends upon a balance of the company's gains, princi-
pally potential savings in acquisition costs, against the losses, costs,
and uncertainties of long-range anticipations. Itis impossible to
avoid speculating on price level fluctuations in any effort to alter the
cyclical timing of capital expenditures, and it is important to realize
that whatever gains come from successful speculation do so at the
expense of foregone earnings and savings during the period of post-
ponement, carrying costs during the period of anticipation, increased
risks from imperfect foresight, and sometimes lost strategic oppor-
tunities.
There are some kinds of investments for which management has
latitude in timing. Replacement investments provide some freedom
because earnings, which come mainly from savings in maintenance,
usually rise gradually with age (though they are affected by fluctua-
tions in volume). The cost penalties of delayed replacement are,
therefore, not always prohibitive. It is particularly feasible if the
company owns many similar, relatively small units (e.g., an automo-
tive fleet). Scheduling such replacement investments at a fairly
uniform rate is common. (And they might even be scheduled anti-
cyclically.)
Uncertainty about the prospective earnings of a project does not,
as some have thought, make its cyclical timing a matter of mana-
gerial indifference. There are many projects for which rate of return
is not calculable. Some of these are postponable, e.g., some employee
welfare investments. But many, and probably most, of these "stra-
tegic" investments do not have much timing latitude. Our analysis
indicates that uncertainty is a major cause of cyclical fluctuation of
13Forexample, the assumption that boomtime prices of crude petroleum and
of its products would continue indefinitely was not uncommon in capital
expenditure proposals in one oil company. The president had to issue a ukase
that all price conjectures be based upon a ten-year historical average, rather
than on the then current (1948) levels, to bring about the needed deflation of
profitability estimates.
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investments and is a malor barrier to alteration of their time pattern,
since it blows up the importance of the near future and discounts
the distant future heavily.
Will better management of capital expenditures make them more
stable cyclically? I don't think so. There is much room for improve-
ment in the concepts and projection techniques used in capital
budgeting by most large firms. But the improvements are, in my
experience, more likely to accentuate cyclical fluctuation than to
smooth
thestandpoint of the individual firm the causes of cyclical
fluctuations in investment are deep-rooted and inescapable. The
shifts in the firm's schedule of demand for and supply of funds
dictate a pattern of investment. Departures from this pattern for the
purpose of stabilizing capital expenditures will result in gain.s that
are relatively small and dubious as compared with the ensuing large
and certain costs and risks. Of course, the possibility of stabilizing
capital expenditures differs among firms. In general, those with rapid
and foreseeable growth and financial strength are most able to make
such changes. But even for them, a voluntary reduction of earnings
and increase of risks would be involved.
Hence if government is to induce stabilization of private capital
formation, the incentives and compulsions must be great indeed;
and if an individual firm does much about it without such changes
in the rules of the game, sacrifices in earnings and loss of security
will probably result.
COMMENT
EDGAR M. HOOVER, Council of Economic Advisers
It seems agreed that achievement of more regularization in business
investment could be expected to alleviate though not to eliminate
14Correctionof price level distortions in the measurement of profits by con-
ventional accounting is a peripheral example of better capital management.
More exact knowledge of the company's real economic earnings might temper
capital formation during an inflationary boom by making executives realize the
extent to which boom earnings are fictitious. But knowledge of real earnings
in the post-World-War-I! period would have worked in the direction of making
investment by autonomously financed companies more cyclical. Real earnings
in 1948 were much lower than reported earnings; hence real plow-back rates
at the cyclical crest were higher than management realized. Such knowledge
could cause more niggardly dividends in periods of rising prices, and more
ample dividends in periods of declining prices. A policy of stable dividends
over the cycle, if it gained widespread acceptance, would tend to accentuate
cyclical fluctuations in internal funds available for capital formation.
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cyclical swings; and that ways of furthering the regularization of
investment should be sought on both the demand side and the
supply side of the capital markets. Let me begin by referring to
Dean's analysis of the supply side.
The significant part of the supply curve, of course, is the section
that cuts the demand curve. Dean's hypothesis is that this section of
the short-run capital supply curve is vertical at all phases of the
cycle for firms which make a practice of relying basically on internal
sources of funds—a category of firms that appears to include quite a
large proportion of the total. Such a firm's investment budget is held
to be limited by the amount of internal funds available, and all
approved projects should have a prospective yield considerably
above the "cost of capital," represented by the initial flat part of
the supply curve. This amounts to saying that the cost of capital,
for most internally financed firms, is a concept without significance
and not worthy trying to measure. Moreover, it means that when
such a firm racks up its various proposals for investment, there is
no need to determine the absolute rates of return on them—the rank-
ing is all that matters, since the cutoff is made in terms of total
amount of outlay rather than any minimum marginal rate of return.
In many situations, it must be a much simpler matter to rank proj-
ects than to gauge their returns and compare them with an estimated
capital cost figure. Possibly the attractions of this simpler procedure
help to account for the wide use of budgetary rules involving
maximum outlay criteria (such as internal funds minus more-or-less
fixed dividends, or formulas based on depreciation accruals or on
rigid rules about liquidity)in preference to minimum returns
criteria.
There is room for further investigation here. More on the basis
of impressions than of informed judgment, I doubt that the case of
vertical supply curve intersection is as common as Dean suggests.
It would be useful to check the hypothesis that the internally
financed firm characteristically determines its investment budget
without regard to the absolute level of prospective returns from the
marginal project. One might ask a number of firms, for example,
why they did not invest more, and then single out for special inves-
tigation those that used only internal funds. If they saw no further
projects warranting outlays of funds, this would seem to indicate
an exception to Dean's generalization. If they did not invest more
because of inability to get more capital, it would then be in order
to find out whether this reflects reluctance to trim dividends, to
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lower standards of liquidity, to undertake external financing as such,
or to borrow. Jacoby and Weston's paper discusses the various
factors and their rationale in considerable detail. Some empirical
studies like those of the McGraw-Hill Publishing Company have
made a contribution in this field by asking firms how their invest-
ment plans would be affected by such factors as a higher price for
new stock (i.e., a lower cost of external equity capital).
To give any broad answer to the problem of investment regu-
larization, such inquiries would of course have to cover various
stages of the business cycle and various types of firms.
Another interesting point in Dean's capital supply analysis starts
with the familiar fact that after a rise in prices, depreciation accruals
based on original cost are generally inadequate to finance replace-
ment of plant and equipment. Depreciation isunderstated by
business accounts—or at least by those accounts accepted for tax
purposes—and profits are overstated. This phenomenon has been
very much in evidence since the war, and seems likely to appear to
some extent during most boom periods in view of the characteristic
cyclical behavior of construction and equipment costs. What is its
effect on boom-period investment?
Dean suggests that the postwar overstatement of profits arising
from this factor served as an added stimulus to investment by mak-
ing the outlook appear even rosier than it was. If so, this factor
works against regularization of investment; and we might be led to
recommend the wider use of replacement-cost accounting as an
indirect way of encouraging such regularization.
But it must be recognized that the accounting distinction between
depreciation and profits is quite irrelevant when a firm budgets its
investment on the basis of total internal funds available, without
reference to cost of capital or the prospective marginal level of
returns on investment—the situation Dean apparently considers
characteristic.
Moreover, various authors of the papers for this conference have
pointed out that one of the common rules of thumb by which firms
determine investment budgets is the matching of investment outlays
with depreciation accruals. More generally perhaps, depreciation
is used as a sort of floor or minimum subject to addition or modifica-
tion as the investment budget takes shape—but in any event it
rates as one of the main elements taken into consideration. Now to
the extent that depreciation determines investment budgets, an
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understatement of depreciation in boom times would seem to lead
to a reduction of the amount of investment, and overstatement of
depreciation in depression periods would be a stimulus to invest-
ment. As such, the characteristic cyclical discrepancy between
depreciation and replacement costs would be a systematic factor
encouraging regularization of investment.
I come now to what is probably the most important point I have
to discuss. In looking over the various analyses of investment-deter-
mining factors presented in Mr. Dean's paper and others prepared
for this conference, one is struck by the importance attached—
rightly, I think—to the factors resting fundamentally on uncertainty.
Uncertainty is probably the main reason for reluctance to commit
resources to fixed investment in advance of a known need, and for
the effort to maintain a more liquid position in bad times than in
good. Uncertainty is the basis of many of the rules of thumb used
for appraising investment opportunities—such as the short-pay-off
criterion—which place great emphasis on quick turnover and proxi-
mate profits and discount the more distant future nearly or wholly
to the vanishing point. Uncertainty is one of the factors contributing
to what several writers have characterized as a bias against external
financing in general and debt financing in particular. It seems ob-
vious that the possibilities for investment regularization depend to
a large extent on whether uncertainty itself could be reduced, and
whether the evaluation of uncertainty could be made more rational.
A "hindsight study" of investment behavior might throw new light
on these possibilities. Suppose selected firms were asked to look
back over their investment behavior of a considerable past period,
and to reconstruct it as they now wish it had been. Presumably,
with the benefit of full hindsight, such an ideal investment series
would be quite different from the actual. It would be instructive to
see how much cyclical regularization might emerge. The differences
between the hypothetical and the actual series would measure the
effect of all the factors of uncertainty, error, and irrationality in-
volved in shaping the actual pattern.
One might then identify which of the errors in investment timing
were due to mistaken forecasts of market conditions, thus getting
an approximate measure of the influence of that factor. Other sources
of error, such as wrong forecasts of the cost of capital, might also be
explored and evaluated in the same way. At some point in this
inquiry, perhaps as a final residual, would emerge a series of dis-
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crepancies chargeable only to irrational behavior, such as the appli-
cation of a short-pay-off criterion without recognition of its limita-
tions, or unquestioning adherence to a policy of not using external
funds.
Whether such a study has ever been made, I do not know. If not,
it might be worth trying. The results should be useful not only to
the investigator_in throwing light on ways in which regularization
might be furthered by changes in financing and investment practices,
changes in tax laws, better forecasting methods, or otherwise—but
also to the respondent himself and to other businessmen, by pointing
up the importance of those factors over which they do have some
control even in an atmosphere of uncertainty.
Such a study might usefully complement and extend a related
type of investigation, in which some pioneer work has been done
recently: the analysis of reasons given for revisions of investment
plans. A major study along this line was reported on by Irwin Friend
and Jean Bronfenbrenner in the December 1950 issue of the Surtey
of Current Business.
It has been found appropriate in the analysis of investment pro-
gram revisions to distinguish two groups of causes for such revisions:
(1) errors in forecasting cyclical or irregular changes such as sales,
prices, costs, or technological opportunities, and (2) systematic
errors, or biases, related to the character of the industry, the length
of time covered by the forecast (e.g., systematic understatement of
long-range investment programs), the size of firm, the size of
project, etc. The rather large discrepancies between anticipations
and actual realized investment, for periods of a year or longer, sug-
gest that regularization of planned investment is by no means
equivalent to regularization of actual investment. To achieve the
latter, it would be necessary not merely to stabilize somehow the
original budgeting of investment, but also to make the budgets
firmer.
One final point. Dean explicitly assumes that regularization of
business investment would not affect in any important way the
average level of such investment over the whole cycle. He says: "We
are concerned primarily with the rearrangement of the time pattern
of substantially the same capital outlays."
Although I agree that this seems to be a practical approach to
the problem from the standpoint of the individual firm, I do not
think the statement should be allowed to pass without some reserva-
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tions. My own opinion, which I realize is in disagreement with that
of many estimable economists, is that regularization might increase
the long-run average level of investment substantially, i.e., that
additions to investment in depressions would not be fully offset by
reductions during boom periods. Consider for a moment our latest
genuine depression—the 1930's. If we had kept nonfarm employ-
ment and working hours from sagging between 1929 and our entry
into World War II, the total output for the decade of the 1930's
would have been about one-third higher than it actually was. Need-
less to say, this is a very rough and hypothetical calculation. But
surely some of this huge amount of unrealized production and con-
sumption would have played a part in speeding up national eco-
nomic growth and would have put us permanently further ahead.
If investment is related to the long-run growth of output, as is gen-
erally agreed, our investment of the past has been geared to the
progress of a machine that often slows up. Over a whole decade,
the machine was missing on one cylinder out of four.
This leads to a point, however, on which there seems to be fairly
general agreement: that while the regularization of investment
would be highly advantageous for business as a whole, and the costs
of achieving it might be regarded as an excellent investment from
the standpoint of the national economy, we have here another of
those cases in which the common benefit offers no adequate incen-
tive to individual efforts to realize it.
This is not to deny altogether the possibilities for regularization
of business investment through private action alone. Some of the
irregularity in business investment may be traced to irrational
behavior, and the exposure of this fact might lead to greater
regularization as a part of sound profit-seeking business policy. Still
another part of the irregularity of investment may be traced to the
errors and deficiencies of forecasting—with improvement in fore-
casting techniques, this might be lessened.
But I suspect that neither irrationalities nor readily avoidable
forecasting difficulties account for any major share of the instability
that exists.1 Most of it reflects, as Dean suggests, the exercise of
rational business judgment and the use of nearly as reliable informa-
tion about the future as is generally obtainable. That being the case,
the possibilities for attaining greater regularization would seem to
lie mainly with government, which may be able by various devices
1Insome cases, indeed, sound and informed business policy might call for
more cyclical peaking than has actually been practiced.
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to make it profitable for business to smooth out its investment
activities. Mr. Hart's paper develops these possibilities in some
detail.
DAVID McCoiw WRIGHT, University of Virginia
One of the penalties of consistency is repetition. I am sorry that
what I say here will probably sound familiar to those who have
read my other works. Nevertheless, the task of combating error has
no end, and since the general approach which I have stood for can
be misunderstood in so many different ways, I think it worthwhile
to state once more why I do not feel that the "regularization of busi-
ness investment," in the sense in which the phrase is apt to be under-
stood, can really be achieved by business action alone except through
measures almost worse than the disease of fluctuation itself.
Like R. H. Tawney, I hold that the "practical" thing for a man in
difficulty to do is not to proceed as rapidly as possible in the wrong
direction. On the contrary, it is absolutely essential that we sit down
and try to figure out what our problem is and where we plan to go.
If we do not do that, we are likely to find ourselves involved in
frantic but useless activity. Now, first of all, what is the problem,
and second, what is it that we are trying to obtain?
I cannot help feeling that in the minds of some people interested
in the notion of the regularization of business investment there still
linger traces of Thorstein Veblen's notion that the business cycle is
solely the result of the profit-seeking activity of business enterprise.
As you know, I have spent a good deal of space in my books show-
ing that this is not the case. The key distinction, I submit, lies in the
difference between pure and perfect competition and, with some
apologies, I would like to repeat once more the terminology which
I use in this connection. Perfect competition, as I define it, means an
absolute lack of friction. Everybody has perfect knowledge. Every-
body can be everywhere at once. There are no obstacles to adjust-
ment and so on. As is now well recognized, even this involves an
ambiguity since an absolutely frictionless economy would be likely
to vanish in a flash of atomic energy; but let us let that pass. By
perfect competition, we shall merely mean a condition in which
everybody would have full knowledge, everybody could be every-
where at once, and resources could move without obstacle in any
desired direction.
Pure competition, on the other hand, means simply a perfectly
elastic demand curve for the product of the individual firm. And the
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really important point is that while competition can sometimes be
pure or nearly pure, it can never be perfect. Clear thinking requires
that we distinguish between those obstacles to adjustment which
inhere in the nature of the universe and those obstacles to adjust-
ment which spring from the organization of the market. Now, bear-
ing this distinction in mind, what is the source of the problem of
investment irregularity?
One of the basic fallacies of much left-wing thought is the idea
that the pattern of consumers' expenditure never changes except
when a businessman advertises a new product. It is often tacitly
assumed that without business interference the pattern of wants
would move in a perfectly symmetrical, predictable manner; for
example, the output of every product would increase at a normal
ratio of, let us say, 5 per cent. Unfortunately, this idea is entirely
mistaken. It is in the nature of the functioning of a growing society
that the various expansion trends of individual industries must be
unsymmetrical. Given varying income elasticities of demand, it
follows of necessity that, in a society which highly values relative
freedom of market choice and therefore permits more-or-less free
expenditure, consumers will spontaneously and necessarily shift the
proportions of their expenditure on various goods as output grows.
Luxuries become necessities and erstwhile necessities disappear.
Thus we must think of a growing society as composed of a number
of widely varying rates of change of individual output. Only by the
greatest of good luck would these total movements spontaneously
add up to a smoothly expanding total. But the problem does not stop
there. Not only does the rate of consumers' expenditure vary, but
also these rates accelerate and decelerate. Stocks are accumulated
and cut down. New inventions come in. Production functions are
constantly being disturbed. It is impossible, therefore, for a society
in which there is a substantial approach to real freedom of con-
sumers' choice to expect always to have spontaneous constant full
employment.
But the ultimate reason for such fluctuations is not "impurity" of
competition, but imperfection of competition. I deplore the English
terminology which lumps together a hypothetical power of instan-
taneous adjustment with the simple presence of a large number of
competitors. If we did have a power of instantaneous adjustment,
it might well be true that as we developed new wants the business-
man would anticipate them instantaneously, and idle money would
not pile up. In consequence net unemployment could not exist. But
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since this is not the case under pure competition, as we find it in
this world, since instantaneous adjustment is indeed an absolute
impossibility, we see that the ultimate cause of the business cycle
lies not in business enterprise but simply in the value of con-
sumers' choice, within a growing market, plus irreducible frictions
of adjustment.
The constructive way, it seems to me, for business to deal with
this problem is to admit it and to point out the real nature of the
difficulty. I feel it would be extremely bad public relations to give
the public any idea that business by itself could handle the problem.
I would not deny Mr. de Chazeau's thesis that business by self-
planning could attain a degree of "regularization," but I do deny
that this degree of regularization would be sufficient to avoid the
business cycle. The only way to have an absolute guarantee of ex
ante stability would be to set up what I have called the "traffic cop"
method of stabilization. That is to say, a central licensing bureau
would have to be created which would have the job of licensing
in adoance the various investment projects. It would be necessary
to give such a bureau not only the power to hold back certain
investments but probably also the power to initiate investments in
order to maintain a smooth, constant flow. This analysis is set forth
in great detail by Beveridge in his Full Employment in a Free
Society, and I can scarcely improve upon it; but I do want to mention
one point which has not, I think, been brought up in the discussion
of this conference. That point is that the actions which a single
business may take to regularize its investment may well have the
effect of unregularizing the investment of some other business and,
therefore, that it is absolutely necessary, if ex ante over-all stability
is our aim, to set up a central clearing house to coordinate. The
problem has been worked out quite elaborately by Mordecai Ezekiel
in his Jobs for All.
I do not dispute the mathematical logic of these schemes. On the
contrary, they seem to me impeccable as long as we stick to purely
arithmetic reasoning. My objections relate rather to sociological and
cultural matters. What must never be forgotten is that the central
traffic cop board would be obliged to decide on the future prosperity
and importance of every section of the economy. For example,
should diesel engines be permitted in order to use Oklahoma's oil
or should a quota of steam engines be required to create demand for
Pennsylvania's coal? These and a hundred similar questions would
be bound to arise, and the likelihood, in my opinion, is that of a
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general industrial stalemate. Again there is the political point. With
such central control over economic life can a really effective political
opposition develop?
Now, if what I have said is true, why do certain people still want
to establish "regularization" and to set up "regularization" schemes?
There are, it seems to me, several strains of thought. First, there are
some who have been led astray and who really do think that the
business cycle is the result of faulty managerial decisions. Second,
there are some, I cannot help feeling, who wish to use regularization
as a means of setting up a cartelized organization of industry. Third
and finally, there are some who wish to avoid government interven-
tion and government deficit finance at all costs.
The first point to bear in mind in this connection is that even if
one were willing to swallow the inevitable cartel features which a
program of general regularization would make necessary, this would
probably not avoid the need for some government action and some
deficit finance. The effect of such a program would probably be
greatly to reduce the margin of risky new investment which is
needed for full employment. Yet if that component of the gross
national product is removed, will it not be necessary for the govern-
ment to create purchasing power? Otherwise a deflationary gap
would be created and the economy would be forced into unemploy-
ment. equilibrium. Some government investment therefore appears
to be the inevitable concomitant of any regularization scheme.
But there is a basic confusion in thinking about the compensatory
Keynesian policy advocated by people of my persuasion. This con-
fusion, in my opinion, results from scrambling together the conse-
quences of deficit finance as such and the consequences of deficit
finance accompanied by certain other policies. If I may use a rather
rough and ready simile, one may think of deficit finance as the oil
which is added to the machinery. The trouble with the left-wing
school is that it insists upon putting in no oil unless accompanied by
an appropriate quota of sand and monkey wrenches, that is, by
policies hostile to the environment necessary for enterprise. The
weakness of the conservative policy on the other hand is that while
it would eliminate the monkey wrenches and sand, it would prob-
ably object to the oil, too. I do not propose an indiscriminate use
of deficit finance. There are many other measures—some of which,
like changes in price and in interest rates, are somewhat neglected
in the papers of this conference; but deficit finance and government
investment remain essential tools in emergency. The problem of
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stabilization for capitalism in the future, therefore, seems to me to
be whether we can educate people to the need for sonie government
action to help stabilize capitalist society, without this gospel becom-
ing the basis for measures which will destroy capitalist society.
I do not know whether a perfect solution can ever be worked out
for this dilemma, but of one thing I am sure. Since I am convinced
that business cannot by itself, through self-planning, avoid the
business cycle, it would be extremely dangerous for the businessman
to lead people to believe that he has assumed such a responsibility.
Since he cannot possibly carry out the task, his assumption of re-
sponsibility will only boomerang violently when the next depression
occurs. "No responsibility without power" is an ancient maxim of
political thought. Is it not just as applicable to the case of business
enterprise as to any other?
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